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ONI CONTRIBUTION TO SE-51

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

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C.2c. What is the extent of the support for the new government in the armed forces (Navy)?

The Indonesian Navy (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia - ALRI) appears to be taking little or no part in politics at present. The senior officers took no active part in the October 17 affair, but Colonel Subiakto, the Commander-in-Chief of the ALRI, and certain other ALRI officers, are believed to side, passively if not openly, with the October 17 group. This would indicate that they do not approve of the present government, and would probably not actively oppose a coup by the October 17 group.

The relationship of the new government to the October 17 group is of interest. This group, comprised of professional Western-oriented officers in the Army, has been reported as favoring an armed uprising. In the past the group has been opposed politically by the Nationalists (PNI) and the Communists and has found support in the Masjumi (Moslem) Party. There is a possibility that the new government may attempt to oust certain members of the October 17 group. In view of this, the chances of the group's resorting to a coup appear to have increased.

C.3c. What is the Communist ability to influence policy and action in the leadership of the armed forces (Navy)?

With the appointment of a Communist-oriented Minister of Defense, it appears that the ability of the Communists to influence any policy or action pertaining to the Navy is greater than before. However, it is believed that any obvious attempt by the Defense Minister to initiate policies or measures which would result in Soviet or Communist penetration of the armed forces (e.g., the

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assignment of Soviet-bloc advisers) would be met with strong opposition by the senior officers of the ALRI. These officers are for the most part favorably disposed towards the U.S., and would like to receive U.S. aid, equipment and training.

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